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The U.S. Supreme Court to
ehear Kiobel, Threatening
Corporate Accountability
for Human Rights Abuses
On February 28, 2012, the Supreme
Court heard oral arguments in the case of
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. The case
involves three questions: whether corporate
civil liability under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) is a question of merits or of subject
matter jurisdiction; whether corporations
can be held accountable for tort liability
for violations of the law of nations; and
whether and under what circumstances the
ATS allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations
occurring outside the U.S. Despite that
the central focus of the case was initially whether a corporation has civil tort
liability under the ATS, the oral arguments
indicate the Justices are instead focused on
the extraterritoriality of the statute itself.
The Court ultimately ordered Kiobel to be
reheard on the question of extraterritoriality
in the fall of 2012.
The ATS, which was enacted in 1789,
gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear
lawsuits filed by non-U.S. citizens for
torts committed in violation of the law of
nations. Initially, it regulated diplomatic
relations between States and addressed
crimes with international consequences,
such as piracy. Modern application of the
ATS in cases such as Filártiga v. PeñaIrala (1980) and Doe v. Karadžic (2000)
have expanded the ATS to hold individuals
accountable for egregious human rights
violations, including genocide, torture, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity, but
there has been a split in federal circuit
courts over whether corporations can
be held liable for these same crimes. Due
to their status as extraterritorial entities,
corporations have escaped international
legal bodies designed to deliver justice for
grave breaches of human rights.
Kiobel is a class action suit against
Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co. (Royal
Dutch) and Shell Transport and Trading Co.
The plaintiffs aimed to hold the companies

accountable for aiding and abetting armed
forces in the alleged killing, torture, and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of
a group of Nigerians in the Ogonia region.
The issue in Kiobel was whether U.S. federal common law or international law is
the proper source of law for determining
whether corporate liability attaches
under the ATS. Counsel for Royal Dutch,
Kathleen Sullivan, argued that the proper
source is customary international law,
which has not held corporations as entities
liable for committing or aiding and abetting human rights violations. Though the
ATS involves civil liability, Sullivan based
this argument on the jurisdiction of international criminal courts.
On this issue, the Second Circuit had
previously held that corporate liability
does not exist under the ATS because
corporate liability is not recognized as a
“specific, universal, and obligatory” norm
of customary international law. However,
subsequent decisions by the D.C. Circuit
in Doe v. Exxon, the Seventh Circuit in
Flomo v. Firestone, and the Ninth Circuit
in Sarei v. Rio Tinto explicitly rejected the
Second Circuit’s reasoning, finding that
the courts do have jurisdiction under the
ATS in suits against corporations. Kiobel
is the first such case to come before the
Supreme Court.
Some proponents of the notion that
courts do, in fact, have jurisdiction point
to the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision
in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission. In that case, the Supreme
Court extended certain First Amendment
protections to corporate entities, thereby
extending rights traditionally reserved for
persons. Since corporate entities enjoy
some rights as persons, Kiobel stood to
hold corporations responsible as persons
where they commit or aid in crimes punIn
ishable under ATS. If the Supreme Court
affirms the Second Circuit’s holding in
Kiobel, the ATS will not be applicable to
corporations for claims of civil liability,
even for the most atrocious acts.
However, during the Kiobel oral arguments before the Supreme Court, the
Justices did not focus solely on the issue
25

of whether corporate persons are liable
under the ATS — much to the frustration
of Petitioner’s Counsel Paul Hoffman —
instead turning their attention to the implications of the extraterritoriality of the statute. Throughout the argument, the Justices
honed in on whether the ATS allows U.S.
courts to hear lawsuits for violations of
international law on foreign soil at all, for
natural or corporate persons. Justice Alito
was particularly skeptical, asking: “[w]hat
business does a case like [Kiobel] have in
the courts of the United States?” and further
commented that finding liability in this case
would only create international tension.”
After the arguments, the Court took
the rarely used step of requesting that
counsel brief a new question: whether the
ATS “allows courts to recognize a cause of
action for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” Now,
not only corporate accountability under
ATS at risk, but the very fate of the ATS
itself. The ATS has been a useful tool for
protecting human rights, and without it,
victims of grave human rights abuses may
be left without legal recourse. Yet among
the varying arguments about domestic law
versus international customary law, only
Justice Breyer brought up the question of
human rights. As both a survivor of torture
and the United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture, Juan Mendez, noted in his
remarks on the case that he “hope[s] that
the Supreme Court will uphold the promise
of these laws, and fulfill the United States’
commitment to protect human rights,
and not allow corporations to get away —
literally — with torture.”
vestigative Judge Refuses to
Prosecute Duvalier for Crimes
Against Humanity

During the 1970s and 1980s
Jean-Claude Duvalier, known as “Baby
Doc” ruled Haiti with repressive tactics
that included forced disappearances,
torture, and detention. In 1986, after
being overthrown by a popular rebellion,
Duvalier fled Haiti along with an alleged
$300 to $800 million USD embezzled during his Presidency. After nearly twenty-five
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years in exile and with no stated reason,
Duvalier returned to Haiti on January 16,
2011. Upon his return, the government of
Haiti reopened cases against him involving financial misconduct and human rights
abuses. Many saw this as an opportunity to
prosecute Haiti’s most notorious dictator,
but Haitian Judge Carves Jean dismissed
the claims of grave human rights violations, saying that the statute of limitations
on his crimes had run. In doing so, Judge
Carves Jean ignored international law
governing the application of the statute
of limitations in alleged crimes against
humanity by granting impunity to Duvalier,
thereby denying his thousands of victims
a chance at justice.
“Baby Doc” Duvalier succeeded his
father, Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier’s
brutal regime in 1971. As “President for
Life,” “Baby Doc” Duvalier assumed the
role of head of state and commanderin-chief of Haitian security forces.
According to a Human Rights Watch
report, Duvalier “commanded the network
of military and paramilitary organizations
that committed a wide range of serious
human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests, torture, ‘disappearances,’ and
extra-judicial executions.” Additionally,
his government held hundreds of political
prisoners in prisons dubbed “the triangle
of death” due to their infamous inhumane
conditions and numerous prisoner deaths.
Despite the many years of documented
evidence of abuse under Duvalier, investigative Judge Carves Jean recommended
that Duvalier only face charges for a misappropriation of government funds; a crime
that, under Haitian law, carries a maximum
penalty of five years in prison. According
to Judge Carves Jean, the statute of limitations had run on the alleged human rights
abuses and thus Duvalier could not be
prosecuted. The complainants, along with
international organizations such as Human
Rights Watch, said they would appeal the
decision not to prosecute Duvalier for the
crimes they suffered. Duvalier’s lawyer,
Reynald Georges, reported that he would
appeal the corruption charges.
Under Section 466 of the Haitian
Code of Criminal Procedure (available
here in French), the statute of limitations for criminal charges is 10 years,
which, according to Mr. Georges, would
make Duvalier’s crime non-prosecutable.

However, this requirement does not necessarily apply to elevated and internationally
regulated crimes such as torture or crimes
against humanity, as Haiti is a party to the
American Convention on Human Rights
and has accepted as binding the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights. The Inter-American Court
has upheld Article 1 of the Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity, which provides that
“[n]o statutory limitation shall apply to
[crimes against humanity], irrespective
of the date of their commission.” While
Haiti has not ratified that treaty itself, the
Inter-American Court has further held that
States under its jurisdiction must nonetheless comply with this imperative of the
law, as “the non-applicability of statutes
of limitations to crimes against humanity
is a norm of General International Law
(jus cogens), which is not created by said
Convention, but is acknowledged by it.”
Moreover, the forced disappearances
characteristic of the Duvalier regime are
considered by international law standards
legally “unfinished” crimes, as the fate of
victims of forced disappearances is as yet
unknown. Any statute of limitations that
could run will not start until their fate is
uncovered and the crimes are deemed “finished.” Until the fate is known, the obligation to investigate a disappearance persists.
Human Rights groups, as well as the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) have condemned
the decision not to prosecute Duvalier
for human rights abuses, and argue that
Haiti is shirking its recognized obligations.
Rupert Colville of OHCHR urged the
authorities to bring justice to the victims of
the Duvalier regime’s human rights abuses,
concluding “there can be no true reconciliation and forgiveness without justice.”
Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers North America for the
Human Rights Brief.

Latin America
Pinheirinho Evictions Highlight
Brazilian Poor’s Lack of Access to
Adequate Housing
Six thousand people have been forcibly
evicted from their homes in Pinheirinho,
26

a community on the outskirts of Sao Jose
dos Campos, in Sao Paulo State, Brazil.
The Military Police Command orchestrated the eviction in the early morning of
Sunday, January 22, 2012 after municipal
Judge Marcia Loureiro signed a repossession order despite Brazilian constitutional
protections and ongoing negotiations with
the federal government to incorporate
Pinheirinho residents into the federal housing program, Minha Casa, Minha Vida
(My House, My Life). The situation of the
Pinheirinho residents highlights the plight
of millions of poor Brazilians whose right
to adequate housing is precarious at best.
The right to adequate housing is the
right of every person to gain and sustain
a safe and secure home and community
in which to live in peace and dignity. It is
enshrined in Article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
Article 11 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), and Articles 21 and 22 of
the American Convention on Human
Rights (American Convention). Brazil is
a state party to both the ICESCR and the
American Convention. To help citizens
realize rights in the ICESCR, governments are obliged to take steps toward
the progressive realization of these rights,
including legislative, administrative, and
judicial measures with a focus on the continued improvement of living conditions.
In order to fulfill its obligation, Brazil
has enacted programs like Minha Casa,
Minha Vida, and has passed a plethora of
laws focused on housing. Most notably,
several articles of Brazil’s Constitution
specifically address the right to adequate
housing: Article 6 lists the right to housing
among those protected under the document
and housing is also mentioned in Articles
7(IV), 23(IX), 183, 187(VIII), 203(II).
Article 183 states that “those who are
squatters in an urban area of up to 250,000
(m2), for a continuous period of at least
five (5) years, without claim for housing,
will be able to have its domain unless he/
she has another urban or rural property,”
assuming the property upon which they are
squatting is not being otherwise utilized.
The Pinheirinho settlement sprung up in
2004 and therefore meets the criteria laid
out in Article 183. During the past eight
years, the residents have built churches and
libraries, and have opened shops and cafes.
They have also been working to legalize
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their right to occupy the property through
Sao Paulo State’s Cidade Legal (Legal
City) settlement regularization program.
Pinheirinho sits on previously unimproved land owned by a bankrupt investment firm. The head of the investment
firm, Naji Nahas, owes a debt of $15 million in back taxes to Sao Jose dos Campos,
which the municipality wished to collect
by repossessing his parcel of land. Brazil’s
federal and state courts have been battling about who has jurisdiction over the
case, and whether the city could actually
displace the residents. The federal government was willing to buy and regularize the
land, which prompted a federal judge to
stay the impending eviction. Although the
municipality of Sao Jose dos Campos and
the government of Sao Paulo state refused
the offer, they did agree to a negotiation
window of fifteen days. This agreement
was breached when the police arrived
in Pinheirinho January 22, after another
federal judge overturned the stay and
declared the fate of Pinheirinho to be a
state matter. The municipal court was
then able to reinstate the original court
order upholding the expropriation of the
land. Despite resistance efforts in defense
of their community, the residents of
Pinheirinho have now been forced into
emergency housing situations provided by
local churches. Most have not been permitted back to Pinheirinho to reclaim what
is left of their possessions.
The plight of the Pinheirinho residents
is unfortunately not uncommon in Brazil,
as the number of evictions has grown
along with the country’s economy. Brazil’s
economic boom has led to public and
private infrastructure and development
projects in the country’s main cities and
their suburbs, many in preparation for
the upcoming World Cup and Olympic
Games. However, tens of thousands of
low-income families have been forcibly
displaced in order to make way for these
projects: according to 2011 government
statistics, 11.5 million Brazilians live
in inadequate and often illegal housing,
compared with 4.5 million in 1991.
Moreover, Brazil reports an estimated
housing deficit of about 7 million units.
To date, it is unclear whether the state
or local government actually had jurisdiction over the Pinheirinho decision and
what will ultimately become of the 6,000

people who called the community home.
However, Article 183 of Brazil’s constitution, as well as its ratification of the
ICESCR and the American Convention,
require Brazil to address its housing crisis to remedy situations like the one in
Pinheirinho, and to ensure the progressive
realization of all Brazilians to their right to
adequate housing.

Argentina Decriminalizes Abortion
in Cases of Rape
In Argentina, the case of a 15-year
old girl who was raped by her stepfather
drew nationwide attention after she and
her doctor were held criminally responsible for terminating the resulting pregnancy. The central issue in the case was
the interpretation of Article 86, paragraph
2 of Argentina’s penal code, which outlawed abortion except where the pregnancy resulted from “rape or indecent
assault perpetrated against a feeble-minded
female.” Argentinian courts have disagreed
over whether this part of the statute applies
only to mentally handicapped women who
lack the capacity to consent, or to cases of
rape in general. In its opinion, the National
Supreme Court clarified the confusion and
confirmed the broader application of the
statute to all cases of rape.
After the girl’s petition to have an
abortion was initially denied by the lower
court in her home province of Chubut, the
provincial Supreme Court there ultimately
granted her the necessary permission.
However, the Public Defender of Chubut
appealed the decision to the National
Supreme Court on behalf of the girl’s fetus
after the abortion had been performed.
Citing Argentinian and international jurisprudence, the Public Defender argued that
the girl’s abortion was illegal because she
is not mentally handicapped and because
the fetus’ right to life had been violated.
The Supreme Court of the Nation summarily rejected the Public Defender’s arguments in its strongly worded opinion,
stating that Article 86, paragraph 2 of the
penal code should be interpreted to allow
legal abortions in all cases of rape, not
only situations where the survivor is mentally handicapped. The Court went on to
explain that any other interpretation would
substantially and unnecessarily increase
the number of illegal abortions taking
place in Argentina, and would have an
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unreasonable negative effect on rape survivors who are not mentally handicapped.
“Forcing every other victim of a sexual
crime to carry their pregnancy to term is
an attack against their most fundamental
rights,” concluded the Court, after also
basing its arguments on Argentinian and
international law.
Referencing Article 75, paragraph 23
of the Constitution, which addresses congressional duties with reference to human
rights, especially the rights of children,
women, the elderly, and the handicapped,
the Court stated that protecting the rights
of children should not be interpreted in a
way that would hold rape survivors criminally responsible for terminating ensuing
pregnancies. In this case, where the survivor was herself a juvenile, the Argentinian
state’s duty to protect her rights superseded its duty to the fetus. The Court went
on to state that Argentina’s adherence to
both the Organization of American States
and United Nations human rights treaties was not compromised by the Court’s
move to decriminalize abortion in cases
of rape. In fact, the Court considered the
equal protection and non-discrimination
clauses of the Argentinian Constitution,
the American Convention on Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, to be the guiding principles of
Argentinian jurisprudence. Provisions of
the Inter-American Convention for the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child that
address fundamental freedoms and equal
protection under the law also apply.
Under the clarified interpretation of the
Penal Code, doctors who perform abortions after receiving sworn statements from
women that the pregnancy they are seeking
to terminate resulted from rape also cannot
be held criminally responsible. As such,
the Court noted its desire to streamline
access to medical services for rape survivors to remedy cumbersome processes
that could be considered structural and
institutional inequality and violence under
the Inter-American Convention for the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication
of Violence Against Women. In doing
this, the Court also hopes to dissuade rape
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survivors from seeking unsafe abortions,
which could potentially result in severe
health complications and possibly death.
The World Health Organization estimated
that twelve percent of maternal deaths in
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008
were due to unsafe abortions. Likewise,
about one million women per year are
hospitalized in the region because of complications from unsafe abortions.
While the Catholic Church and other
pro-life organizations in Argentina have
denounced the Supreme Court’s ruling,
women’s rights activists have hailed it as a
step in the right direction for reproductive
freedom in Argentina. As evidence of this,
several days after the Court issued its decision, the National Campaign for the Right
to Legal Abortion rallied representatives
from Argentina’s main political parties and
proposed legislation which would decriminalize abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy, showing the issue will not end
with the Supreme Court’s decision.
Christina Fetterhoff, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers Latin America for
the Human Rights Brief.

Middle East and North Africa
Israel Cuts Ties with the UNHRC
On March 26, 2012, Israel announced
its intent to sever ties with the United
Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
following the Council’s continued investigation into Israel’s settlements in the
West Bank. The international legality of
these settlements has been in question
since Israel began building on land occupied during the 1967 War. The Palestinian
Authority, who claims the legal right to
administer some of the land on which the
settlements are built, moved in March for
the UNHRC to investigate possible human
rights violations that may ultimately result
from Israeli operation of the settlements.
According to UNHRC president Laura
Dupuy Lasserre, the probe would enlist
a panel of human rights experts to report
back to the UNHRC concerning “the
implications of the settlements on civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural
rights of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including
East Jerusalem.” The Israeli government,
displeased with the result of the vote

triggering the investigation, is now cutting
all ties with the UNHRC including
refusing to allow the UNHRC access to
the settlements.

UNHRC compared to other operating bodies. The latter can investigate matters with
the weight of whatever treaty applies to the
matter in question.

The UNHRC is an operating body
within the United Nations, and comprised
of forty-seven member states tasked by
the General Assembly with strengthening
the promotion and protection of human
rights within the United Nations member
community. It was established pursuant to
Resolution 60/251 in April 2006, replacing
the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights as the principal investigatory body
for human rights situations requiring the
United Nations’ attention.

Given the lack of compulsory power in
the UNHRC’s enabling resolution and the
absence of a specific treaty setting forth
its scope and mandate, it is likely that if
Israel chooses to continue its refusal to
cooperate with the UNHRC, there will be
no substantive international legal consequences. Participation in UNHRC activities, including the fact-finding missions
Israel takes issue with, remains technically
and practically voluntary. Despite being a
permanent agenda item for the UNHRC,
Security Council resolutions against Israel
continue to be unrealistic given the United
States’ ability to exercise its Permanent
Five Security Council veto power over any
proposed resolution, pursuant to Article
27(3) of the UN Charter.

The human rights obligations of UN
member states can stem from either
General Assembly resolutions or treaty
responsibilities. Whereas bodies like the
UN Committee Against Torture or the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child are
charged with monitoring member state
compliance with specific agreements and
conventions, General Assembly resolutions
are non-binding and carry no affirmative
international obligations. As such, although
international norms are a powerful international relations tool in and of themselves,
departures from these norms do not carry
the full weight of consequences associated
with violating international legal agreements. This disparity can impact state decision-making, even though the obligations
a given country has across both mediums
may be substantially similar.
In the context of the UNHRC, Resolution
60/251 emphasizes “the responsibilities of
all States, in conformity with the Charter,
to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all,” but provides no
other language empowering the Council to
enforce these responsibilities. Instead, the
duties of the UNHRC are described as “[p]
romoting human rights education,” “advisory services,” and “mak[ing] recommendations to the General Assembly.” By contrast, the Mandate of the UN Committee
Against Torture — set forth in Part II of
the UN Convention Against Torture Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment — provides for the use
of discretion in investigating reports of
systematic torture by a state, as well as
the Committee’s ability to weigh evidence
and solicit input from state parties before
Ha
making its final report. There is thus
marked different in the stated role of the
28

A common criticism of the UNHRC
is that its members have themselves been
subject to allegations of human rights
violations in recent years, which further
undermines the Council’s credibility as a
genuine, committed guardian of human
rights. The UNHRC current membership
includes China, Saudi Arabia and Libya,
all of whom have been widely suspected or
outwardly accused of serious human rights
violations in the recent past. Recent lists of
candidates for membership have included
Sudan and Syria. The UNHRC’s lack of
actionable international legal authority to
compel cooperation further cements the
Council’s role as an information-gathering device rather than an intermediate
enforcement mechanism. It seems clear
that Israel’s refusal to engage the Council
on any level will frustrate the impact of
any investigations or advisory services.
Without the unilateral ability to make
policy determinations, it will be up to
diplomatic actors other than the UNHRC
itself to bring Israel back to the table moving forward.
Kyle Bates, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this column for the Human
Rights Brief.
ave Syrian Opposition Groups
Violated the Geneva Conventions?

On July 31, 2012, video footage
surfaced on YouTube purporting to show
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the summary execution of members of the
pro-Syrian regime Berri clan by the Syrian
opposition. While the events portrayed
are difficult to verify, the video showed
what many believe to be Zeino Berri, an
alleged regime loyalist and shabiha leader
(pro-regime thugs used by the regime
to violently crackdown on dissent), and
another clansmen being taken into a yard
and lined up against a wall. Moments later,
the sound of assault rifles erupts and the
camera pans to a heap of bodies on the
ground. According to activists, fourteen
members of the clan were killed by shooting and hanging. While the Free Syrian
Army (FSA) “strongly condemned” the
executions, maintaining that it had no links
to the group responsible for the act, the
Tawheed Brigade, an Aleppo-based rebel
group affiliated with the FSA, claimed
responsibility for the executions, citing the
Berri Tribe’s failure to uphold an earlier
agreement to remain neutral during the
conflict. Two weeks prior to the incident,
the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) designated the fighting in
Syria to be a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), officially subjecting combatants to the Geneva Conventions. In light
of the ICRC’s recent designation, the summary execution of members of the Berri
clan by armed opposition groups constitutes a violation of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions, which requires
that those not taking an active part in hostilities, including members of the armed
forces in detention, be treated humanely.
The conflict in Syria began in March
2011 when demonstrators, inspired by
other Arab Spring revolutions, began calling for the resignation of President Bashar
al-Assad and his regime. While protests
were initially peaceful, the regime’s continued and increasing use of violence to
suppress the revolution coupled with the
international community’s inability to
come to a diplomatic solution, inter alia,
resulted in the increased militarization
of the opposition movement. The FSA,
formed in July 2011, serves as the primary
armed opposition group and is comprised
an estimated 40,000 military defectors and
volunteers. Over the past several months,
groups like Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch, while recognizing
that Syrian government forces “perpetuate
human rights violations on a mass scale,
including crimes against humanity and war
crimes,” have expressed concern over rebel

violations of international law including
unlawful killings and torture.
The Geneva Conventions — to which
194 states are party — regulate conduct during armed conflict. While the
Geneva Conventions generally concern
international armed conflict, Common
Article 3 and Additional Protocol II dictate minimum requirements for belligerents engaged in NIAC. Although Syria
is not a party to the Additional Protocol,
it is a party to the Geneva Conventions,
including Common Article 3, which have
become universally applicable. When designating hostilities as a NIAC, the ICRC,
whose legal determinations are not binding but extremely authoritative, considers
the intensity of the conflict (including its
duration) and the level of organization of
armed opposition groups. The ICRC previously designated the areas around Homs,
Hama, and Idlib war zones, but in midJuly, it designated Syria to be in a state of
NIAC, suggesting that both the intensity
of the violence and the organization of
armed opposition groups throughout the
country reached the level necessary for the
designation. The ICRC interprets Common
Article 3 as applying to both to state armed
forces as well as organized armed groups.
Thus, this designation officially subjected
all combatants, including the regime’s
Syrian Army, the opposition’s FSA as well
as other “organized and armed opposition groups,” to the provisions outlined in
Common Article 3.
Common Article 3 requires that persons
not active in hostilities, including members
of armed forces who are in detention, be
treated humanely, and prohibits “murder
of all kinds” and “the passing of sentences
and carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court.” The summary execution
of the fourteen Berri clan members is a
clear violation of Common Article 3, and
ultimately provides grounds for a later war
crimes prosecution.
In a televised interview on August 1,
an FSA spokesperson reiterated the FSA’s
commitment to the Geneva Conventions
and called for an investigation into the
killings, the results of which Amnesty
International says should be referred to
the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria.
According to Amnesty International, this
referral would be “instrumental for possible prosecution” if the situation in Syria
29

is referred to the ICC. While it is clear that
the Syrian regime remains responsible for
a majority of the war crimes committed
during the conflict, the FSA should nonetheless demonstrate its commitment to the
Geneva Conventions and prove that this is,
as the group claims, an isolated incident
by completing an “impartial, independent,
and comprehensive” investigation into the
killings.
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this column for the Human
Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
The Practice of Ritual Killings
and Human Sacrifice in Africa
Despite the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights’ that provides an individual is entitled to respect for his life and
integrity of his person, ritual killings and
the practice of human sacrifice continue in
several African countries. These practices
entail the hunting down, mutilation, and
murder of the most vulnerable people in
society, including people with disabilities,
women, and children. Reports indicate that
killings of this nature occur in Nigeria,
Uganda, Swaziland, Liberia, Botswana,
South Africa, Tanzania, Namibia, and
Zimbabwe. Because of the secrecy involved
in ritual sacrifices, a majority of these incidents go unreported and uninvestigated.
Anti-sacrifice advocates face an uphill
battle in combating these rituals because
the practices are largely denied and touch
on cultural underpinnings, resulting in an
ideological conflict between protection of
human rights and respect for the beliefs
and practices of other cultures.
Those who practice sacrifice and ritual
killings believe them to be acts of spiritual fortification. Motivations to carry
out these acts include the use of human
body parts for medicinal purposes and
the belief that human body parts possess
supernatural powers that bring prosperity
and protection. In Uganda, reports indicate
that child sacrifice is a business where
the wealthy pay witch doctors to conduct
sacrifices in an effort to expand their fortunes. In Swaziland and Liberia, politicians
allegedly commission ritual killings to
improve their odds in elections. In parts of
South Africa, ritual killings are culturally
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accepted, and the practice is often not
reported by community members.
Questions of cultural relativism may
arise with respect to ritual killings because
they may be linked with religious beliefs.
Article 8 of the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights guarantees freedom
of conscience, the profession and free
practice of religion. The article also states
that “No one may, subject to law and
order, be submitted to measures restricting
the exercise of these freedoms.” While a
broad reading of Article 8 guaranteeing
the right to religious freedom could theoretically permit ritual killings for religious
reasons, the “subject to law and order”
clause may be invoked to limit the free
practice of religion with respect to ritual
killings. Furthermore, reading the Charter
in its entirety supports a prohibition on
ritual killings. For instance, Article 5 states
that every individual shall be “entitled
to respect for his life and the integrity of
his person.” If ritual killings were permitted as an acceptable exercise of religious
freedom, the door is opened to many of
potential human rights violations on the
basis of religion.
In response to recent reports of ritual
killings allegedly conducted by some traditional healers, other healers have spoken
out against ritual killings, arguing that
those practices are a disgrace to the history and culture of African medicine men
and healers. In March 2012, Sierra Leone’s
union of traditional healers met to put
forward their campaign against ritual killings. Since the union’s founding in 2008,
their mandate has always been to stop
indiscriminate killings and afflictions of
the innocent.
Activists rallying against ritual killings are calling for stronger protections,
including legislation that would allow for
the regulation of traditional healers. Some
countries, such as Uganda, Rwanda, and
Nigeria have taken steps to begin regulate
traditional healers, but regulation is not
widespread. Appropriately regulating traditional healers could provide necessary
protection for individuals seeking care
from traditional healers and could hold
healers accountable for unlawful acts, such
as ritual killings. Furthermore, regulation
could provide protection for traditional
healers, for example, with respect to intellectual property rights.

As they have done for centuries, traditional healers continue to fulfill an important role of providing beneficial medical
services to communities. However, the
practice of ritual killings and human sacrifice goes against the fundamental human
rights norm of ensuring respect for an
individual’s life and integrity of person.
Although the African Charter guarantees
the right to freely practice one’s religion,
ritual killings are not permissible on this
basis. The positive contributions of traditional healers to many African societies should not be compromised by the
practice of ritual killings. Activists and
governments can ensure respect for the
human rights of all individuals by working
to ensure transparency and accountability
among traditional healers.
Saralyn Salisbury and Lindsay Roberts,
J.D. candidates at the American University
Washington College of Law, wrote this column for the Human Rights Brief.

Europe
The Arrest and Deportation of
Suspected Islamic Extremists in
France
Over a ten-day period in March 2012,
Mohammed Merah, an Islamic extremist,
shot and killed seven unarmed people in
Toulouse, France. In the wake of these
killings, the French government proceeded
to arrest and detain nearly thirty suspected Islamic terrorists. To date, two
have been deported and French authorities
have stated that others will follow. Unlike
Norway’s judicial response to the Oslo
shootings of July 2011, France has undertaken a responsive plan of action that sidesteps the criminal justice system and relies
instead on detentions and deportations.
Several of the detainees are part of the
suspected terrorist organization, Forsane
Alizza, which French authorities banned
in February 2012. These individuals have
been accused of “being part of a criminal gang connected to a terrorist enterprise” — a crime punishable by up to
ten years imprisonment. State prosecutors
have indicted others in the organization for
allegedly plotting to kidnap a prominent
Jewish judge from Lyons. Paris prosecutor
Francois Molins explained that many of
those arrested have undergone religious
indoctrination and physical training in
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parks and forests near Paris “in order to
take part in a jihad.” He also stated that
several suspects operated websites calling for an Islamic caliphate in France and
the application of Shariah law. Outgoing
President Sarkozy has insisted that the
detentions and deportations are consistent
with the law, and he explained the government’s mission by stating, “All those who
make remarks contrary to the value of the
Republic will be instantly put outside the
territory of the French Republic. There
will be no exception, there will be no
leniency.”
Anti-terrorism is an area of international law that is unsettled, and over which
there is considerable disagreement. On
the one hand, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that
all persons receive the equal protection of
the laws without distinction as to national
origin or religion; that no one be subject
to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; that
everyone have the right to an effective
remedy by a competent national tribunal;
that if charged with a crime, each person
have the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty according to law in a
public trial; and that all individuals have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, opinion, expression, and
association.
Yet, on the other hand, the United
Nations Security Council and General
Assembly have implemented a number
of regulations allowing counter-terrorism
measures to be taken by states individually
and collectively. States, as sovereigns, may
legitimately limit the exercise of certain
rights, particularly freedom of movement
and the right to privacy, when doing so
protects public order and safety or national
security. This broad and potentially limitless authority has led to the recognition
of the risk of infringement on human
rights through anti-terrorism measures.
In response, the UN Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force has published
a Basic Human Rights Reference Guide
to the Stopping and Searching of Persons.
Specifically, this instrument suggests that
a decision to stop or search an individual in an effort to counter terrorism
must always be consistent with international human rights law, be necessary
to prevent terrorist acts or to apprehend
those who participate in terrorist acts, and
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not disproportionately or discriminatorily
impact ordinary citizens.

Kosovo’s Draft Criminal Code and
the Risk to Freedom of the Press

A now well-settled theme in anti-terrorism law is the general ambiguity and
secretiveness surrounding state counterterrorism actions. As such, little information has been released to the public regarding France’s recent arrests and detentions.
While the Toulouse tragedy certainly justifies a state’s action to prevent future
occurrences of terrorism, the prompt and,
in some cases, final nature of the government’s arrest, detention, and deportation
of dozens of suspected terrorists raises
many questions regarding the protection
of these individuals’ human rights. For
instance, exactly how much evidence do
French authorities have on these suspected
terrorists? Is it merely coincidence that
they acquired sufficient evidence to arrest
thirteen individuals allegedly plotting to
kidnap a prominent Jewish judge just
after the Toulouse killings? Do authorities
have more evidence against some of these
suspected terrorists than websites, posted
in exercise of their right to freedom of
expression and opinion, and evidence of
physical training sessions, in exercise of
their right to freedom of assembly? Are
these individuals receiving due process
prior to deportation? Additionally, there
are other concerns regarding the difficulty
of identifying terrorists without making
distinctions based solely on national origin
or religion. As Frederic Pechenard, the
Director of the French national police, put
it: “There are hundreds of young French
people who go to Egypt, to Yemen, to
Pakistan, to study the Koran . . . who are
nothing more than religious. Amid these
hundreds of people are a few potential
terrorists.”

The parliament of Kosovo is currently considering a new draft criminal
code that has proven rather contentious
with the Kosovo media and international
human rights organizations. Two articles
of the draft code, articles 37 and 38, may
restrict freedoms of press and expression.
Specifically, Article 37 of the proposed
criminal code subjects journalists to possible criminal liability for publishing defamatory remarks in the media. This provision
is new because the current criminal code
does not contain a comparable counterpart.
Article 38 of the proposed code, however,
is similar to and modeled after article 29
of the current criminal code. Article 29
assigns criminal liability to those who
“take part as [professionals] in the publication of media information,” who are members of media editorial boards, and their
assistants, when such individuals refuse to
disclose their confidential sources, if the
disclosure of such information is necessary to prevent: an offense punishable by
at least three years in prison, an offense
of inducing another to expose their private
parts or masturbate in public, the showing
of pornography to minors under 16 years
of age, misappropriation in office, and the
accepting and giving of bribes.

Without more information regarding
the arrests, one cannot justifiably make
assertions as to whether the suspected terrorists’ human rights are being respected.
Even so, the arrests and deportations of
dozens of suspected Islamic terrorists in
response to the killings of one represent
yet another example of a state bypassing
the criminal justice system in favor of
administrative measures that more easily
enable denials of due process and equal
protection of the law.

The freedoms of press and expression
are fundamental human rights recognized
by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Kosovo is a party to both the ICCPR and
the ECHR, and is thereby bound by their
provisions. Article 19 of the ICCPR lays
out the right to freedom of expression
to seek, receive, and impart information
through any media of choice. This right,
however, may be limited by law when
necessary to respect the “rights and reputations” of others, and to protect national
security, “public order,” or “public health
or morals.” Similarly, article 10 of the
ECHR provides that everyone has the
right to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public
authority. This document, however, also
includes exceptions to freedom of expression: this right may be subject to “restrictions or penalties when prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public safety, for the
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prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, [and] for
the protection of the reputations or rights
of others…”
After the National Assembly adopted
the proposed code on April 20, 2012, the
media community in Kosovo began a sustained protest urging the President not to
approve the code. On April 23, hundreds of
journalists protested in silence before the
National Assembly, and on May 3, Kosovo
media outlets engaged in a one-day boycott
when they refused to cover news regarding the Kosovo government. After reviewing the draft criminal code, Kosovo’s
President, Atifete Jahjaga, returned the
proposed code on May 8 to the National
Assembly with instructions for revisions
of the two contentious articles, stating the
draft criminal code provisions were “contrary to Kosovo’s Constitution.”
While there has been much protest
over the code’s proposed articles restricting freedoms of press and expression, it
seems that the international legal documents protecting those freedoms allow for
Kosovo’s proposed restrictions. Both the
ICCPR and the ECHR provide for restrictions on freedom of expression that aim to
protect the rights and reputations of others.
Such provisions arguably make allowances
for imposing criminal penalties on those
who publish defamatory statements about
others, as defamation tends to destroy the
reputation of its target. Similarly, both the
ICCPR and the ECHR provide for restrictions on the freedom of expression when
necessary for the preservation of public
order, health, morals, and national security. These permissible restrictions could
arguably justify a law imposing criminal
liability on media members who refuse to
reveal their confidential sources in cases
involving any crime subject to a sentence
of more than three years.
The proposed articles of Kosovo’s
draft criminal code themselves may not
violate international human rights law.
Nevertheless, their implementation may
be contrary to traditional notions of fundamental human rights and the freedoms
associated with modern democratic societies. After all, such restrictions may provide
cover and support for corruption and illegal activity by discouraging the press from
acting as the public watchdog and failing
to protect whistle-blowers.
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Rachael Curtis, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers Europe for the Human
Rights Brief.

South and Central Asia
Call for Independent
Investigations of Political
Disappearances in Bangladesh
On April 17, 2012, Elias Ali, secretary
of the Sylhet Division of the opposition
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), disappeared. Ali and his driver were both
abducted that night, and Ali’s car and
cell phone were found abandoned in a
parking lot near his home in Dhaka. In
response to Ali’s disappearance, Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed said publically that she believes Ali and his driver
are “hiding” at the behest of the BNP
to allow opposition groups to blame the
government. Ali’s wife, however, believes
that security forces took him because of
his involvement with the BNP. In reaction
to the Prime Minister’s words, the BNP
and allied groups announced a countrywide strike on April 22nd. According to
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Ali’s disappearance is just one of a growing number
of disappearances of government opposition leaders and activists. HRW called for
Bangladesh to immediately order an independent investigation of the growing number of politically related disappearances
occurring throughout the country. In 2000,
Bangladesh acceded to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), indicating a commitment
to protecting the rights of individuals
from enforced disappearances. By failing
to investigate the increasing numbers of
disappeared persons, Bangladesh is not
fulfilling its responsibility to provide
effective remedies, provided in Article 2
of the ICCPR.
According to Odhikar and Ain-OSailash, two Bangladeshi human rights
organizations, there were only two enforced
disappearances in 2009. In 2010, there were
18 disappearances, and in 2011, 30 people
were disappeared in Bangladesh. By May,
22 people have already been disappeared
in 2012. Human rights organizations in
Dhaka accuse the Rapid Action Battalion
(RAB), the Bangladeshi government’s
military unit, of hundreds of extrajudicial
killings and dozens of disappearances in

the past year. RAB, which consists of 12
battalions, was originally set up as an antiterrorism force in 2004. Five of the RAB
battalions operate in Dhaka. According to
Odhikar, RAB killed 732 people between
RAB’s 2004 inception and March 2011.
Extrajudicial killings escalated after the
current Awami League government came
to power in January 2009, but the RAB
officially claims that each member of
the opposition parties’ death occurred in
crossfire and was in no way politically
motivated. Although international and
domestic human rights groups believe that
the government is responsible for the violent suppression of opposition groups,
the Bangladeshi government claims that
political opposition disappearances have
nothing to do with the RAB and are instead
planned attempts to blame the government
for violence.
Enforced disappearance, under Article
2 of the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (ICCPED,) is “any form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State
or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the state, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
E
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts
of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the
law.” The ICCPED was adopted in 2010
to prohibit states from employing forced
disappearances and to hold states accountable for the protection of citizens from
enforced disappearances, which includes
the duty to investigate disappearances
even if they are not perpetuated by the
state. Although Bangladesh claims that the
RAB is not responsible for the pattern of
enforced disappearances and extrajudicial
killings throughout the country, ICCPED
still requires that Bangladesh investigate
the disappearances to determine the cause.
However, because Bangladesh is not
a signatory to ICCPED, U.N. bodies cannot apply the ICCPED directly. Instead,
any action in response to Human Rights
Watch’s demand for independent investigation should come under the ICCPR, to
which Bangladesh is a party. Under Article
2 of the ICCPR, Bangladesh is obligated
to provide effective remedy to those whose
rights have been violated. According to
the Human Rights Committee’s (HRC)
General Comment 31, Bangladeshi authorities have a duty to investigate and to
32

bring the perpetrators to justice under
the ICCPR. General Comment 20 also
specifies that “effective remedy” means
that investigations of complaints must be
prompt and impartial.
Because Bangladesh is not a signatory to the First Optional Protocol, which
would allow the Committee to hear individual complaints of violations of the
ICCPR, none of the individuals who have
been affected can bring a claim against
Bangladesh to the HRC. Another option is
for human rights organizations in Dhaka
and Human Rights Watch is to submit
an NGO Country Report to the HRC.
The HRC can then examine the NGO
Report alongside Bangladesh’s Country
Report and issue its recommendations to
the Bangladeshi government to address
the pattern of enforced disappearances
throughout the country.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers South and Central
Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
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Indonesia Ratifies the UN Migrant
Workers’ Convention
On April 13, 2012, Indonesia’s parliament unanimously ratified the
International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families (Migrant
Workers Convention). Lawmakers and
civil society groups welcomed the entry
into force of the treaty, which Indonesia
had signed twelve years earlier but is
only now legally binding. The Convention
provides fundamental human rights protections for Indonesia’s approximately three
million documented migrant workers currently overseas. However, only 45 countries have ratified the Convention. Absent
harmonization with Indonesia’s domestic
legal framework and reciprocity by receiving states, its impact on overseas workers
may be slight in the short-term.
The rights articulated in the Migrant
Workers Convention overlap with other
major international human rights treaties
and equalize migrant workers’ rights with
those of citizens with employment status.
Indonesian and international human rights
advocates hope the Convention’s reporting requirements will act as a catalyst
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for domestic reform. Under Article 73,
Indonesia must submit a report within
one year to a Committee outlining its
legislative, judicial, administrative, and
other efforts taken to comply with the
Convention’s provisions. The substantive
provisions applicable to Indonesia as a
state of origin include Article 37, which
obligates the government to inform workers of their rights and obligations under
the local law of their destination country
before departure. Article 37 further specifies that state parties must freely provide
this information in an appropriate language. Under Article 65, parties must also
maintain services to provide information
and assistance regarding travel authorizations, living conditions, and any relevant
local labor regulations.
The Convention’s provisions mandating
state delivery of important pre-departure
services could provide the catalyst to transform Indonesia’s much-criticized National
Law on the Placement and Protection
of Indonesian Overseas Workers (Law
39/2004). Currently, Law 39/2004 delegates extensive responsibility to private
recruitment agencies in facilitating overseas work placements without sufficient
regulation. These agencies register workers with the Ministry of Manpower and
Transmigration, arrange employer contracts, and conduct pre-departure trainings. The law, however, does not compel
specific government action to effectively
investigate and monitor these practices.
Workers are sometimes fraudulently forced
to pay excessive costs for travel documents
once in the capital for pre-departure orientation, the quality of which is unregulated.
The vague provisions of Law 39/2004 at
once involve 13 government agencies in
oversight but create fatal jurisdictional
challenges; regional governments are powerless to sanction or withdraw agency permits on their own. This failure to clearly
delineate duties means that all government
stakeholders are able to eschew responsibility. The result has been a lack of awareness and inability to address illegal recruitment practices at the local level.
Even under a revised Law 39/2004,
Indonesian migrant workers will continue to face numerous challenges as they
travel to states that are not a party to
the Convention. Neither Saudi Arabia nor
Malaysia is a party, which together receive
nearly 80% of Indonesia’s workers. Last
year saw 1,075 worker deaths in both

countries according an Indonesian human
rights group. A moratorium on sending
workers to Saudi Arabia has been in place
since August 2011, but recruitment agencies nevertheless have defied this ban.
Twenty-five maids remain on death row
there, and the remains of another, cause of
death unknown, were returned to Indonesia
in the week preceding adoption of the
Convention. Malaysia is once more a destination country following the adoption of
a 2011 Memorandum of Understanding,
which now allows workers to keep their
passports and enjoy one day of rest each
week. Still, the agreement does not address
minimum wage concerns or contribute to
the regulation of illegal recruitment practices. Indonesia’s Minister of Manpower
and Transmigration has pledged not to send
workers anywhere that does not respect
the Convention. However, countries like
Malaysia can and have in the past easily
replaced Indonesian labor with migrant
workers from Cambodia. Indonesia is
therefore forced to juggle competing interests to sustain this crucial component of
its economy, which saw USD $8 billion in
remittances in 2011.
Indonesia’s ratification of the
Convention is a significant first step to preserving migrant workers’ rights. Yet much
work is still needed to realize what Foreign
Minister Marty Natelegawa describes as
a breakthrough towards better protection
mechanisms. Indonesia’s regulatory framework needs revisions to provide better
oversight of recruitment agencies, and this
resolve should also be reflected in the government’s bilateral agreements. Perhaps
most importantly, widespread acceptance
of norms enshrined in the Convention is
necessary to fully realize its protections.
Otherwise, progress will continue in incremental steps by labor supply countries
like Indonesia, which can only achieve
partial success towards protecting migrant
workers’ rights absent cooperation by the
international community.

Wukan Holds Local Elections,
Displays Civil Disobedience
In March 2012, a small fishing village of 10,000 residents in southern
Guangdong province elected Lin Zuluan as
its leader. Nearly 80% of Wukan residents
cast ballots in what was seen as a shocking concession from local Communist
Party authorities. The election followed
a lengthy standoff between farmers and
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the local government, which had transferred the village’s remaining farmland to
developers for industrial use. After initial
violence in the fall protesting confiscation
of their land without adequate compensation, the Chinese government’s reaction
has been surprisingly tolerant. Despite
continued targeting of dissident lawyers,
Tibetan monks, and high-level politicians,
Wukan has emerged as an anomalous and
successful instance of civil disobedience.
Protests in Wukan came to a head in
December 2011 after Xue Jingbo, a leader
of the movement, was abducted and died
in police custody. Xue Jingbo had been
detained for his role in the first rallies held
in September when a violent clash between
villagers and police occurred. Authorities
said he had died of a heart attack, while
family members said his body showed
multiple signs of physical abuse. Nearly
1,000 villagers gathered in outrage and
refused to retreat, shouting slogans like,
“Down with corrupt officials.” Shortly
thereafter, senior provincial Communist
Party officials met with village leaders
and promised to release other protestors
in police custody. They also agreed to
recognize a democratically elected village governing committee, the local body
controlling finances and land sales. This
committee, now comprised of residents
with no prior government experience, is
seeking return of the land sold by previous
authorities. Provincial Communist Party
Vice Secretary Zhu Mingguo recently visited Wukan and promised that a portion
would be returned by May 1, 2012.
These recent developments have left
Wukan residents hopeful and also fueled
speculation about the village as a model
for grassroots democracy in China. Critics
waiver on their effectiveness, but direct
elections have been occurring at the village level in China since the draft version
of the Organic Law of Village Committees
was piloted in 1987. The National People’s
Congress fully adopted the law in 1998,
which allows for direct election of three to
seven village committee members by eligible voters over the age of 18. This principle of self-governance is also found in
the Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China. Article 111 states that “[t]he
chairman, vice-chairmen and members of
each residents’ or villagers’ committee
are elected by the residents.” As is the
case at other levels of Chinese government, some provinces hold only indirect
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elections by permitting voting on candidates nominated by village communist
party branches. However, in other provinces, committee members are nominated
directly by villagers, by groups within the
village or in numerical groups reaching a
certain threshold.
The Organic Law of Village Committees
has led to several important developments.
First, provincial level governments have
promulgated local laws on the implementation of vague provisions within the
national law. Thus, the national law has
given birth to a variety of experimentation
at the local level, which in some cases
has led to legitimate systems of direct
representation. In Lishu county in Jilin
province, implementation rules explicitly
forbid nomination of candidates by the
Communist Party. Villages like Xinfeng
in Jilin province have also prevailed in

holding direct elections this past March.
In this way, democratically elected village committees have sprouted throughout China and are exercising leadership
alongside village Party branches. Their
co-existence has contributed to what some
observers describe as changes towards
more inclusive, democratic leadership
styles. Most importantly, the national law
has created a legal infrastructure for selfgovernance at the grassroots level.
Wukan villagers described the March
2012 election as the first real poll in
years. Contrastingly, the Secretary of the
Guangdong Provincial Committee of the
Communist Party denied the election
represented any significant departure in
governance. Secretary Wang Yang maintained that, “What made the Wukan election special was that the organic law and
election rules were fully observed and
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implemented in detail this time, unlike
previous pro forma elections.” By admitting past corruption, Wang Yang shrewdly
framed the Party’s response to the Wukan
protests as an admirable resort to the rule
of law. “That’s why we decided to stand
on the side of the villagers instead of a
few local village officials,” said Wang
Yang, who is also competing for a spot
in China’s Politburo Standing Committee.
The Wukan phenomenon is therefore not
an innovative model for democracy, but
instead is an example of deft political handling of local unrest prior to Party leadership elections next year.
Thais-Lyn Trayer, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, covers East, Southeast
Asia & Oceania for the Human Rights
Brief.

